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WHY ARE BUSINESS CORPORATION LAWS
LARGELY "ENABLING"?
Elvin R. Lattyt
Professor Wilber G. Katz was unquestionably correct when, a few
years ago, he viewed the modern business corporation acts as being basically "enabling" in the underlying philosophy of their general structure
and of most of their specific provisions.' Nothing has happened in the
intervening years to change the picture. He classified the manifested philosophies as: first, those that are "enabling" in the sense that they are
characterized by freedom of choice in who among the interested parties
takes what in the way of risks, control, and profit; second, those that are
still enabling but are supplemented with certain requirements to keep the
basic decisions of the interested parties more in line with idealized notions of contract, tort, and fiduciary relations; third, those that reflect a
"paternal responsibility" theory; and, fourth, those that reflect a "social
responsibility" theory.
SoCIAL-RESPONStBILITY PHILOSOPHY

The social-responsibility philosophy deserves a short word, if only because it is quite clear that our corporation law draftsmen and legislative
committees have steered clear of it, with an exception or two to prove the
rule. The theory is nothing new of course; students of corporation law
recall the debate between Professors Dodd and Berle in the 1930's. Under this theory, management in publicly-held corporations is expected to
pursue a "higher ideal" than maximizing profits for absentee shareholders; management would have a responsibility to its employees, customers, suppliers, the community, and the "public" in general. At times, exponents of this theory seem to view the passive shareholder as some sort
of a tolerated vestigial anachronism--one who has no right to expect anything more than to be pensioned off at some "fair" return (presumably,
low), with the rest 6f the corporate profits administered for other groups.
(If the concern succeeds, that is; if it fails the shareholder takes the
beating.)
Perhaps this theory is a companion to a production-for-use economic
theory as opposed to production-for-profit, and looks to a system where
t Dean and Professor of Law, Duke University. The writer here wishes to acknowledge
his intellectual indebtedness to Dean Robert S. Stevens, in whose honor these papers appear
in this issue of the Quarterly, and whom the writer was privileged to have as a law teacher
I- his earliest days of law study.
1 1"t. "The Philosophy of Midcentury Corporation Statutes," 23 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 177 (bcR). Thl1 was part of a symposium on "The New Look in Corporation Law."
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eventually managerial decisions are made by public officials. But legislatures, in their corporation acts at least, are adhering to the classical concept of the corporation as an institution to make profit for the shareholders. Many would say that this is still a sound basis for the corporate
economy, especially if management for profit is coupled with a liberal
dose of another rather conventional corporation law doctrine-the business judgment rule. Under this doctrine, for example, no shareholder can
successfully call management to account for paying higher than the lowest wage possible, or for charging less than "what the market will bear"
for its product, or for paying a higher-profit margin to a dependable supplier, or for putting blue-collar workers on an annual salary basis, etc.'
True, the current swing in corporation statutes permitting gifts to charity
may conceivably be cited against the classical profits-for-shareholders
theory and as supporting the view that "social responsibility" is being
reflected in corporation statutes. The inference bears rechecking. Conceivably, all that is happening is a generous dose of the business judgment rule. What court is to say that "public" donations are not in the
line of "good business"? Even so, the board of directors had better watch
out if they contribute a substantial amount of the textile company's cash
to the president's wife's pet charity, protection of penguins in Antarctica. Perhaps the ever-present judicial control over abuses of the business judgment rule, based as it is on the theory that the enterprise does
belong to the shareholders, coupled with a broad tolerance of that rule's
application, makes for a better setting for adjusting conflicting interests
of various groups and for a more efficient allocation of resources than
would a corporation statute purposely geared for "social responsibility."
After all, with the presence of organized units of labor, suppliers, and
consumers, plus antitrust sanctions and public opinion, the picture is not
entirely devoid of elements of countervailing power. At any rate, one will
not find in a twentieth century business corporation act provisions for
social justice-not for full employment, labor-management sharing of
administration, antitrust features, Robinson-Patman-like protection of
suppliers or customers, fair employment practices, etc. I do recall seeing
one early draft of a corporation act some years ago in which there were
provisions for "labor shares," but nothing came of the idea. Actually,
2 Even in the heyday of "antisocial" capitalism, the shareholder could not hold corporate management to account for extending to employees a generosity that went beyond
the corporation's bare legal duty. Said Bower, L.J., in Hutton v. West Cork Ry., 23 Ch.
D. 654, 672-73 (1883), in the contest of a disputed gratuity, "it is for the directors to
judge" so long as reasonably incidental to business; he added, "the law does not say that
there are to be no cakes and ale . . . ." A railroad company, he said, "might send down all
the porters at a railway station to have tea in the country at the expense of the compan."
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with the free-wheeling available under "enabling" corporation acts, even
"labor shares" could rather easily be worked out.
THE "ENABLING"

PHILOSOPHY

The "enabling" philosophy that underlies modem American business corporation laws presents four main facets. One is to free the participants in the corporate venture from the fetters that had accumulated through the centuries in corporate enterprise (many going back to
mercantilism days of regulated economy and reflecting notions of "concession" from the Sovereign), and to put the arrangements for the allocation of risk, control, profit, and residual ownership on a free contract
basis, just as in a partnership. Except for consequences that flow from
limited liability, a corporation law under the "enabling" philosophy should
not, any more than a partnership code, tell the associates what kind of
business they can or cannot do, how big or little the enterprise can be,
when or where it shall operate, or what their arrangements are to be inter
sese for running the business. This, of course, is heresy to nineteenth
century straight-jacketing of corporations.
The second facet of "enablingism" is that the corporation law should
combine the best elements of a blue print for building, mending, expanding, and dismantling the corporate mechanism and of a sailing chart
that clearly marks the rocks, channels, depth of water, and buoys. The
need that management feels for this chart-blueprint stems from many
causes: the mystique of the corporate entity; the hierarchic structure
of corporate statutes, charter, and by-laws; the frequently complex
structure of ownership and management; the tradition of sovereign permission; the documentary record for collective action and for registering
decisions; and, the role of "paper." The "corporation" itself is born,
lives, and dies all by and upon paper; when it eats, sweats, emotes, gets
buried-"it" emits paper. What is wanted, then, is a statutory chartblueprint to tell the decision-makers what they can do and how to do
it-anything from a stock option to a merger.
The third facet of the prevailing enabling philosophy is that the
power structure within the corporation (the promoter group in the early
stages but, in any event, the managerial group) should be free not only
to move fast and efficiently in conduct of the business operations but
also should be free to determine the basic structure of the corporation
and to propose its later changes. Free, that is, to determine the contents
of the associational contract, however much it be a contract-by-adhesion,
leaving to the passive associates only, or just about only, one basic free-
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dom: to come in or stay out. In other words, if they do not like it, let
them sell their stock. One might suggest that this "enablingism" inevitably leads to strong pro-management sets of charter and by-law clauses
in matters of managerial powers, l5rivileges, compensations, exculpatory
clauses, bonuses, and stock options.
The fourth facet of "enablingism" is that it is not very concerned
with reform or with preventing or minimizing abuse of power.
One finds little evidence that draftsmen of modem corporation laws
in the United States are interested in exploring abuses that arise from
the legal structure of corporations with a view to seeing what, if anything,
can.be done about it in a corporation law. A different attitude prevails
in England. The famous Cohen Report, prepared to suggest amendments
to the English Companies Act of 1909, while showing no trace of a witch
hunt against companies and the control group, did find conditions that
generated abuses, and it showed a balanced and sober concern for needed
reforms.' That same tradition is maintained in the more recent Jenkins
Report, which again considers amendments to the English Companies
Act of 1948.'
Can it be that so many of the fears expressed by critics in the early
days of the new "enablingism" (though this was not then the term for
it) have turned out to be groundless that we now have little urge to call
forth any legislative reform effort, at least in a "mere" corporation law?
TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY FEARS OF COR'ORATE FREEDOM

At the turn of the century critics viewed the then new New Jersey
and Delaware corporation laws with great alarm. Today most (but not
all) of their fears seem a bit foolish. The twentieth century accepts a long
list of corporate "freedoms" as a natural state of affairs, whereas the
nineteenth century mind saw the relaxation of seemingly logical and
"natural" restrictions as shocking invitations to irresponsibility and
chaos. For example, a rather hysterical note in the American Law Review
in 1899, 5 commenting on the new Delaware corporation law, in extravagant language ridicules the features of the law whereby a Delaware
corporation:
1. can be organized for any lawful business except banking;
2. can conduct business anywhere in the world;
3. can have perpetual existence;
3 Board of Trade, Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment, passim
(1945).
4 Board of Trade, Report of the Company Law Committee, passim (1962).
5 Note, "Little Delaware Makes a Bid for the Organization of Trusts," 33 Am. L. Rev.

418 (1899).
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4. need have no local shareholders-the individuals composing the corporation can reside anywhere and everywhere;
5. need have no Delaware resident in its officialdom except one director;
6. need have no relation whatsoever to any business in Delaware-it could
be a Delaware corporation farming in Kansas;
7. need have no more than 2000 dollars worth of authorized "capital
stock;"
8. need only have 1000 dollars worth of the authorized stock subscribed
for;
9. may issue stock -for something other than cash, and at whatever valuation is put upon that something "in good faith" (a term apparently
fit only for ridicule);
10. need hold neither its shareholders' meetings nor its directors' meetings
in Delaware;
11. can keep its stock books and transfer books out of state, wherever it
wishes;
12. need require no payment on the issued shares before starting business;
13. has no limit to its authorized "capital stock" except what limit the
organizers want to write into the charter;
14. can, in other words, be as big as it pleases ("you can bloat yourselves
out according to your own sweet will" 6);
15. can readily amend its charter;
16. can merge or consolidate with other corporations;
17. can easily increase or decrease its "capital stock;"
18. can own and vote the stock in other corporations.
To this list another writer 7 in the same issue of that law review
adds a few more objectionable new powers of corporations:
19.
20.
21.
22.

to incur debts without limit, unless limits are stated in the charter;
to make examination of its books by "intermeddlers" more difficult;
to operate without significant information through an Annual Report;
to own land in any amount, situated anywhere.8

Today, no one gets excited over the "evils," actual or imagined, in
most of that list. Indeed, what was a house of horrors for the critics of
that day has become the architectural model for subsequent corporation
statutes. Thus, the Model Business Corporation Act of the American
Bar Association really accepts Delaware, in substance, as the model to
follow, and rightly so, on the whole. If there is something wrong in our
corporation statutes, the cure does not lie in simple nineteenth century
straight-jacketing. Even in this magnanimous mood, however, one may
have occasional misgivings. One may wonder what the structure of
American large scale enterprise would be today if we had stuck to the old
nineteenth century notion that one corporation cannot hold stock in another corporation. Perhaps we would not have had that fantastic pattern
6 Id. at 422.
7 Letter From W. Wooley West to the Editors entitled "Delaware Missionary Enterprise," 33 Am. L. Rev. 794 (1899).
8 To the Illinois lawyer of that day (see note 7 supra), this really was heresy.
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of public utility holding companies that led finally to the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 and its unscrambling to three-or-less-tiers
of corporate structures. We might not have had the "leverage" that
accentuated the boom of the '20's and the bust of the '30's. On the other
hand, legal ingenuity might have recreated the entire problem of holding
company devices through that good old device of equity, the trust. At
any rate, one of the prime targets of the turn-of-the-century critics of
the New Jersey and Delaware corporation laws was the newly legalized
stockholding power of a corporation. Apparently it was reasoned that
these laws now gave statutory support to those very combinations in
restraint of trade that were otherwise forbidden to pool the controlling
shares of competing corporations into the hands of a trustee or a board of
trustees. The fallacy is easier to spot today than in those days when, with
thoughts focusing on ultra vires, corporate power and privilege and legality
all flowed imperceptibly into each other. It was an easy jump from saying
that since a corporation had power to acquire stock of another, all stock
acquisitions were now permitted and legal. Thus Lincoln Steffens observed of the stock-holding section of the new New Jersey corporation
law: "There we have the holding company, which makes the trust lawful
and strong" 9-a non sequitur, of course. It seems to be a common fallacy
to believe that if a corporation law confers a power, carte blanche goes
with that power. (One criticism of an early draft of the present New York
Business Corporation Law provision permitting a corporation to buy up
fractional shares was that a corporation might issue all its shares as
fractions and then buy them up!)1° Probably what Mr. Steffens and his
contemporaries feared was sheer size of business ventures. The logical
result of the attitude would be to put a legal limit to size. But, aside from
the impossibility of limiting size by self-effectuating legislative fiat, "Big
Business" was inevitable under modern technology and marketing. The
problem of what to do about the "bad" ramifications of bigness could
not be cured by a "mere" corporation law, unimplemented by tailor-made
legislation with administrative regulation. It was futile for the early critics to direct their barbs against removal of the old straight jackets in
the corporation statutes.
9 Steffens, "New Jersey: A Traitor State (pt. 2)," 25 McClure's Mag. 41, 47 (1905).
10 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 509 was, in fact, finally redrafted to meet the criticism. The
criticism seemed to be way out in left field. Where are legislative draftsmen to stop under
this carte blanche theory of granted power? Some far-out critic will suggest that New
York's freedom to hold shareholders meetings any place stated in the bylaws would
permit meetings to be scheduled for Antarctica if the bylaws so provide, even if the
motive of the power-wielders who adopted the bylaws is to oppress the minority. If the
reader thinks this is farfetched, this precise criticism was made when the present North
Carolina Business Corporation Act, permitting meetings to be held any place stated in
the bylaws, was under consideration.
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SENsITIV

AREAS

Nevertheless, the new freedoms brought new problems and abuses
or intensified old ones. Consider, for example, what a Pandora's Box of
troubles was opened by the new freedom permitting shares to be paid
for in property or services, as well as in money, especially when coupled
with the provision that the valuation set by the directors "in good faith"
is not to be questioned. Actually, both provisions are quite justifiable,
economically and juridically, although not enough attention has been
given to the relationship of "good faith" to self interest and breach of
trust. Perhaps this too is an area where nothing can be done short of
administrative supervision and licensing. State Blue Sky Laws and, in
1933, the Federal Securities Act eventually had to step in. At any rate,
practically no state corporation law tries to set any basic rules of fair
play in this area, even though many issues of shares in corporations are
not covered by the Securities Act or are not effectively regulated by any
Blue Sky commissioners. Apparently the attitude today is that if shares
are being issued at overvaluation or for a discriminatory consideration,
the problem should be thrown into the lap of those responsible for amending the Blue Sky statutes and regulations or the SEC statutes and regulations. Yet it would not be impossible to improve by legislation that
considerable body of irrational and inconsistent common law that holds
promoters liable in damages or to a cut-back in shares for their overreaching transactions."
The power of the insiders-"management"--to make self-serving
decisions has always been a source of problems in corporation law. There
are many occasions in the organization and operation of a corporation
where insiders make decisions affecting their own interests, e.g., as to
their own compensation and fringe benefits. It is something of a strain,
even upon the most conscientious soul, to determine how much his talents
and services are worth. Even within the bounds of "good faith," a standard which equity is presumably ever ready to apply, a little liberality
can run salaries up to very handsome returns-much more than the
recipient would ever get in a competitive free market. Stock options and
bonuses in particular invite abuse when not granted in competitive arm'slength dealings. Yet very little protection against the possibility of selfserving decisions in those matters is found in corporate laws. True, the
New York Business Corporation Law, like the laws of many states,
requires that stock options to directors, officers, or employees be approved by a majority of the shares entitled to vote, but, here again, the
11

Cf. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-53 (1965).
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beneficiaries of the proposal are in the strategic position of operating the
proxy machinery, the device that brings in the votes. Actually, more
protection against abuse in stock options has probably been brought
about by the federal income tax laws which give favorable tax treatment
to "restricted" stock options and (since 1964) to "qualified" stock options
to employees than by the general corporation laws of the fifty states.
Corporate managements themselves have been more conscious of a need
for objective determination (or at least of an appearance of objectivity)
in their stock-option plans than have legislatures. Many corporations
subject their plans to outside experts or nonparticipating directors for
approval, or request these parties to present plans.
In general, the standards of fiduciary loyalty that we do have in
corporation law have been created by judicial decision. The role of the
state legislatures has been, it seems, only to relax those standards. Common-law decisions invalidating directors' decisions because of adverse
interest are at times replaced by the statutory "fairness" standard. I find
it difficult to quarrel with that. But that only makes the point sharper:
is there anything the corporation statutes can do in such matters as selfvoted salaries, stock options, and bonuses? Probably not much, but one
would at least like to see some proposals, aside from the stockholders'
approval requirement, if only to reject them as impractical. That requirement is for the most part a meaningless ceremonial. Not even that alleged
safeguard, however, is required by statute for self-dealt salaries. Would
it improve matters to shift from a general standard like good faith or
fairness to a more particularized standard? In the matter of salaries,
for example, the required standard might be "what would be paid for
such services at arm's length under competitive conditions." North
Carolina has such a standard for self-voted salaries 2 but apparently
believed that such a test was not quite feasible for stock options; and even
for self-voted salaries that standard ran into strong opposition in legislative hearings.
Another area where management makes self-serving decisions is in
planning what "pro-management" provisions to put into the charter.
Here again the "enablingism" of modern statutes plays into management's
hands. Today all but a handful of state corporation laws permit the
charter to contain any provision (not expressly forbidden) for the regulation of the internal affairs of the corporation (Model Act) or, as New
York puts it:
The certificate of incorporation may set forth any provision, not inconsistent with this chapter or any other statute of this state, relating to the
12 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-30 (1965).
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business of the corporation, its affairs, its rights or powers, or the rights or
powers of its shareholders, directors or officers including any provision
relating to matters which under this chapter are required or permitted to be
set forth in the by-laws. 13
Since those who organize the corporation are normally those who
expect to run it, the standard charter today contains clauses validating
adverse interest transactions of directors and officers, exculpatory
clauses to relieve from liability for mismanagement, and indemnification
clauses to reimburse management for expenses in defending itself when
called to account by shareholders or sued by outsiders to enforce some
liability. Except possibly in indemnification clauses, management (actually, the counselling attorney) has not sought to push the pro-management provisions to the very extreme, in part for fear that the effort
would boomerang and tempt courts to strike down even mild applications
of the provision. Indemnification clauses, however, frequently go so far as
to reimburse for expenses even those who have not been judicially declared blameless, but this attitude is no more liberal than that reflected
in most legislation on such clauses.14
In all these charter clauses, state legislatures have shown little concern
for abuses that might be expected from conflicts of interest and have
been very sparing in enacting any off-limits markers. Indeed, one almost
suspects that the Model Act's section 4(o) not only wanted management
to get reimbursed for any reasonable expense in defending itself so long
as not judicially declared culpable (which is questionable enough), but
wanted to make sure that the charter could "make any other indemnification," above and beyond all that, entirely possible and unquestioned-all as provided for in the charter, by-laws, special agreement, etc.
Nevertheless, some states have shown concern over the possibility
of abuse in self-dealt indemnification, particularly California, New York,
and North Carolina, and to a lesser degree a few other states. Only
North Carolina, however, attempts to forbid exculpatory clauses exempting management from all liability. Also, by North Carolina's fairly
complete (and liberal) statutory treatment of directors' adverse interest,
it would seem quite clear that clauses on that topic in the charter would
be invalid if they ran counter to the policy reflected in the statute.
Why the almost studious avoidance in corporation statutes of the
basic problem of management's adverse interest? A partial explanation
lies in the business community's touchiness at the mere suggestion that
management might yield to temptation in adverse interest situations. It
13 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(b).
14 See Frampton, "Indemnification of Insiders' Litigation Expenses," 23 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 325 (1958) (written before enactment of the new N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law).
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is something that one does not talk about. I am reminded of an incident
at a legislative hearing when the present North Carolina Business Corporation Act was under consideration. One spokesman wanted to eliminate entirely section 32 on directors' liability for illegal dividends,
distributions, loans, etc. Actually, that section is very kind to management, and takes pains to bail it out of some tough rules of liability to
which management is subject in the absence of such statutory treatment.
But the spokesman's comment was along this line: the long section (all
of two pages) on directors' liability looks bad-it gives people ideas, and
wrong ones.
Other sets of fiduciary problems, where perhaps the fiduciary element is more subtle, include repurchases of its shares by a corporation
from favored holders, which is but another side of the pre-emptive rights
coin. And not to be overlooked is that growing realization in modern
common law of the fiduciary duties of the shareholder "control" groupincluding the questionableness of their "right" to a higher price per
share for their blocks of stock than the price to noncontrol-group shareholders when a purchaser is out to buy up the shares. It is submitted,
moreover, that a whole set of fiduciary duties should attach to the "dominant" shareholders. On all these fiduciary matters, state statutes are
silent. Even when draftsmen do give thought to such provisions, they may
get set back by skittish legislators. For example, the following mild
provision in the bill presenting the present North Carolina Business
Corporation Act to the legislature was stricken out by the Senate Judiciary Committee. After defining "dominant shareholder," the bill provided, in what would have become section 55-74:
Dominant shareholders stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation
and to other shareholders and shall exercise their power in good faith for
the benefit of the corporation. 15
Except for the phrase "for the benefit of the corporation," which
arguably might have been stricken out as not leaving enough play for
legitimate self-interest, it seems about as difficult to be against that proposition as to be against God, Country, Motherhood and Social Justice.
Another "sensitive area" relates to the twentieth-century freedom
of a corporation to issue and sell shares and creditor-securities with
whatever rights management wants to give those participants in the venture. Again, human nature being what it is, one might expect that
management will reserve the best set of rights for its own securities or
for those of a favored class-perhaps with some self-identified group.
15 N.C. Sen. Bill 49, 1955 Sess., § 55-74.
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Of course this invites the observation: so what? In a free market, selfinterest is best served by free choice, and nobody compels anyone to buy
securities with weak sets of rights. If the security is a poor one, nobody,
or only a fool, will buy it. If you make a poor mousetrap nobody will
beat a trail to your door. Disregarding for the moment the power of
modern advertising, the danger to the economy and the possibility of
distress from fraudulent security sales are so great that for over fifty
years we have, in most parts of the country, shown concern with such
sales, as is indicated by Blue Sky Laws. By the vigilance of administrative officials, Blue Sky Law is perhaps the better way to protect the
public. But some features of corporate shares are so useless economically and so fraught with danger juridically, or so easy to proscribe,
that a general corporation law might well be a proper place for outlawing
or restricting those features. Such features would include the "once-gonegone-for-good" feature of unpaid dividends on noncumulative preferred
shares even when dividends are passed in the face of current earnings
or earned surplus. Also, except in open-end investment companies, shares
that purport to be redeemable at holders' option can be a mirage. Yet
no state corporation law shows any concern for these matters, except
North Carolina for the former, and that state and New York for the
latter. Of course, administrative officials under a full disclosure statute
like the Federal Securities Act of 1933 might force the prospectus to
paint such a complete (and hence bleak) picture of noncumulative
preferred as to discourage its use. So far as I know, that has not been
done.
Besides the disillusion potential in the noncumulative and holderoption-redemption features, preferred shares are exposed to even more
serious dangers by the new freedoms. The freedom universally conceded
to a corporation to buy its own shares, coupled with the freedom to create
a surplus by the mere legal device of reducing legal capital, plus the
availability (more or less free) of unearned surplus for dividends and
share repurchases-all expose the preferred shareholders to encroachments on their "cushion" through repurchases of junior shares and, except
where the preferred is in arrearage, to dividends on junior shares.
Some state statutes do concern themselves with some of these problems.
Even the Model Act and its followers, not particularly noted for a protective philosophy, forbid "distributions" from capital surplus (but not
from earned surplus) if net assets would then be below the liquidation
priority of preferred shares."0 New York has made a gesture in the right
16 ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 41(d), (1960) (not clear whether the prohibition
applies even to the under-water preferred that is receiving the distribution).
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direction by lifting no-par preferred's involuntary-liquidation priority
virtually to the lofty status of protected "capital,"' 17 and North Carolina
forbids dividends and share purchases that would reduce net assets below the liquidation priority of a class senior to the class getting the dividend or being purchased, and forbids purchases of junior shares in the
face of arrearages on senior shares.' Texas forbids repurchase of shares
if there are any arrearages, though it is not clear whether that means arrearages on those shares, on shares senior thereto, or on any shares. 9 It
probably means arrearages on tkose shares, which is another problem
that needs attention in view of the possibility of the corporation depressing the price by not paying preferred dividends and then buying up the
shares at depressed prices. 20
This discussion of preferred's headaches brings up preferred's biggest
headache: that its preferences, arrearages, and all may be wiped out in a
recapitalization by charter amendment or merger. The new freedom not
only has put an end to "vested rights" of preferred shares2 but also
(perhaps) to any "fair plan" requirement with any kinship to the fairness test in insolvency reorganizations. 22 Indeed, say some, courts have
no business putting the label of "fraud" on a recapitalization that wipes
out preferred's rights so long as the plan manages to bring in enough
votes, including the preferred's votes, to put the plan through. They contend that there is no such thing as a fraudulent recapitalization plan if it
23
is legally voted and gives equal treatment of all shares of the same class.
I here suggest, nevertheless, as I have suggested before,24 that corporate
law contains too many sticks with which to beat the preferred shareholders into voting and too many carrots with which to induce them into
voting for plans loaded in favor of junior classes to justify letting the
problem be solved by the proxy count. Yet the proxy count is the hapless
solution to the problem in all states except California (where the plan is
screened by the Blue Sky machinery), Nebraska (where judicial screening can be sought), and North Carolina (where half a dozen road blocks
are thrown up against possibly unfair plans).
Finally, no general corporation law has shown much inclination to give
17 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 506(b).

N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-50(c),-52(e) (3)-(4) (1965).
19 Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.03(c) (1956).
20 Cf. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-52(f)
(1965), with its requirement of prior notice of
intention to buy.
21 Gibson, "How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?" 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 283
18

(1958).

Ibid.
Ibid.
24 Suffice it to refer to Latty, "Exploration of Legislative Remedy for Prejudicial
Changes in Senior Shares," 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759 (1952).
22
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legislative attention to certain "entity" problems created by the new freedom to incorporate for any purpose, with or without the further freedom
of a corporation to hold some or all shares of other corporations. These
are the problems of the multicompartmentalized business and of the inadequately capitalized corporation-the creditor-proof trap for the tort
claimant or the unwary contract creditor. Again, legislatures are skittish
about any statutory hint that the entity created can, when necessary, be
disregarded. The bill presented to the legislature proposing the present
North Carolina Business Corporation Act contained a very orthodox section about corporate existence beginning with the filing of the articles,
and then contained this final sentence:
Nothing herein relating to corporate existence shall be construed to curtail or to abrogate any principle of law or equity which imposes upon shareholders, as co-owners of an inequitably capitalized enterprise, liability upon
any claim against the corporation.
This was stricken out by the Senate Judiciary Committee.25 Yet all it
really amounted to was a reminder to courts that nothing in the statute
is meant to arrest the development of common law or equity in placing
safeguards upon the abuses to which the unrestricted privilege of limiting one's (or a group's) liability can lead.
WHY NOT ENACT "PROTECTIVE" CORPORATION LAWS?

There are many reasons why no serious attempt has been made to cope
with the problems that twentieth-century "enablingism" has created or
intensified for corporation law. •
(1) The Threat of Foreign Incorporation
First, and perhaps foremost, is the conviction that a general corporation law less liberal than that of some other state will merely drive local
business to incorporate in that other state. Even if we accept this version
of Gresham's Law, be it noted that this is not saying that local illiberality
will drive business out of state; most of the time all that will happen is
that the business will merely incorporate elsewhere and this corporation,
then of another state, will simply qualify to do business in this state as
a "foreign" corporation. True, perhaps an occasional local-resident entrepreneur embarking upon a cosmopolite venture would, with an illiberal local corporation law, incorporate in, say, Delaware, without coming
back home as a foreign corporation, to the loss of local incorporating fees
and of "franchise" taxes due annually thereafter. But the day has passed
25 However, -the Committee was not sufficiently eagle-eyed to catch and delete the
repetition of that very same principle in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-53(h) (1965) where, indeed,
it is stated with even greater force.
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when states seriously considered charter mongering for revenue purposes.
Whatever faults one may find with corporation laws of the states in the
second half of the twentieth century, no one can say of the states today,
as Lincoln Steffen said of New Jersey in the early years of the century:
New Jersey sold us [the rest of the country] out for money. She passed
her miscellaneous in corporation acts for revenue. And she gets the revenue.
Her citizens pay no direct tax.2 6
Nevertheless, even if illiberal local corporation laws do not drive out
business or cause loss of substantial revenue, they are futile. Local business, whether really local, or nation-wide, or world-wide in character, will
simply take the form of an outside corporation, a Delaware corporation,
for example, and thereupon Delaware law governs, or so we have assumed. But perhaps that assumption can today be challenged. My colleague, Professor Brainerd Currie, has demonstrated that there is much
more punch in local law, in competing with out-of-state law for application to an act or transaction, than Beal and the Restaters had led us to
believe.17 Moreover, courts are not the sole makers of new conflict of
laws rules. A corporation law can, within constitutional limits, well prescribe its own set of rules for applying local law to foreign corporations,
no matter how "internal" the affair in question is. Why then do not abuseconscious, reform-minded legislators and draftsmen legislate accordingly? Passing over for the moment the fact that such abuse-conscious,
reform-minded persons are rare indeed, there is the sheer difficulty of
selection: what parts of local corporation law shall we apply to which
doings of foreign corporations? The local corporation law cannot simply
say: In the courts of this state all foreign corporations [that do business
in this state] shall be deemed governed by the corporation laws of this
state. Just imagine what a mess-all of the contents of the charter,
by-laws, stock certificate, etc., and all of the steps past and future, of
incorporating, taking organic action, etc.--all invalidated for not conforming to local law.
But let us not beat this dead horse that never was. So, one proposes,
let us be selective; let us pick out, say, a local provision like this one: a
corporation shall not issue redeemable common shares.2 But what busi26 Steffens, "New Jersey: A Traitor State (pt. 1)," 24 McClure's Mag. 649 (1905). In
the same vein are the remarks in Note, 33 Am. L. Rev. 419 (1899): "little Delaware,
gangrened with envy at the spectacle of the truck-patchers, sand-duners, clam-diggers and
mosquito-wafters of New Jersey getting all the money in the country into her coffers,-is
determined to get her little tiny, sweet, round, baby hand into the grab-bag of sweet
things before it is too late."
27 See Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963); Latty, "Pseudo-Foreign
Corporations," 65 Yale L.J. 137 (1955).
28 Such a provision is suggested by, but not quite like, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 512(c).
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ness does this state have applying that provision to a foreign corporation
that does one per cent, or less, of its business in this state and has one
per cent, or less, of its shares held by local residents? (Never mind the
further and nicer question of applying that provision to redeemable common shares already outstanding before the foreign corporation came into
this state.) But suppose those percentages were ninety-nine instead of
one? Enough has been said to suggest difficulties.
It should, nevertheless, be possible to survey the local corporation law's
protective features, ascertain whom those features were meant to protect,
and then apply those features in local courts wherever such local interests are, in the court's opinion, being jeopardized. The imagined protectees might include: creditors as against the corporation-group (shareholders, directors, officers, and the "entity" itself), shareholders and the
"entity" against management, shareholders against other shareholders,
and management against unsavory shareholders who harass and extort
with strike suits and threats thereof. But should the local corporation law
specifically make all its protective provisions govern all foreign corporations whenever any local resident within the to-be-protected category
would have a "right" which would be protected only by the local corporation law? For example, statutory restrictions on dividends are aimed to
protect creditors (among others) and very often expressly make directors
liable to creditors for declaring and paying unlawful dividends. Should,
therefore, the local state expressly make applicable in favor of a local
creditor its own more protective dividend provisions to any and all foreign
corporations? If so, directors of a corporation operating all over the country must comply with the dividend laws of every state, or of the "toughest"
state, or run the risk of liability. (To make matters worse, accounting
principles that frequently determine the legality of the dividend may
differ among the states.) On the other hand, certain protective local provisions can feasibly be made applicable to all corporations, domestic or
foreign. Examples would be the restrictions on using a misleading corporate name within the state.
The foregoing suffices to suggest that perhaps only a high degree of localness calls for application of some of the provisions of local corporation
law to a foreign corporation. How difficult a problem this presents for the
draftsman can be seen from the pattern of application and exclusion of
local corporation law in New York, the only state that has made a serious, fruitful attempt to close the loophole to the nose-thumbing foreign
corporations. New York has defined localness by excluding corporations
whose shares are listed on a national security exchange and those with
less than half of their business income for the past three years allocable
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to New York under the tax law. In North Carolina, the only other state
where the legislature seriously considered a similar plan for closing the
loopholes, localness of the enterprise of the foreign corporation was likewise made the focal point for applying selected sections of local corporation law. Localness was defined in terms of being authorized to do
business in the state as a foreign corporation and of doing no substantial
business in the state of incorporation (a fairly typical Delaware corporation pattern) and of being "more closely identified with the business life
of this State" by virtue of the place and character of its business and personnel. 9 Regardless of the reasons for the legislature's rejection of the
proposed North Carolina provision, the attempt demonstrates the difficulty of drafting against evasion of local corporation law by the device
of foreign incorporation.
(2) Complexity of ProtectiveMachinery and Simplicity of "Enablingism"
It is difficult enough, as above shown, merely to draft a protective device. But if the purpose is to be achieved, the draftsman must draft
against evasion, which leads to more complex provisions to protect the
first protection; the more complex the machinery, the greater are the
chances that it will not work, especially against a skillful evader. To illustrate, recall the North Carolina attempt to apply its corporation law
selectively to certain foreign corporations doing business in the state.
Most of this attempt could be defeated by forming a foreign holding
company to own all the shares of the enterprise that is doing the local
business. In that situation the holding company need never "do business"
in this state and thus the legal relation between management and shareholders, and among the shareholders inter sese, would all be normally
governed by the corporation laws of the state in which the holding company is incorporated-and at this point we are right back where we
started. So, the North Carolina draftsmen, in addition to drafting for
"pseudo-foreign corporations, came up with proposed provisions to define
a "pseudo-foreign parent corporation" and to make selected sections of
local law applicable to it. Even that, it was believed, did not really close
the loopholes. Accordingly, this whole complex culminated in a grandfinale provision for compelling reincorporation, for sufficient cause, of
those pseudo-foreigners under the local corporation act in a court action
brought by a corporate creditor, shareholder, or the Attorney General.
At some point in the complicated pattern of a really "protective" corporation law, the game is not worth the candle, especially since there are
respectable voices saying that even for protecting a general corporation
statute from evasion by means of a foreign corporation, the policing can
29 N.C. Sen. Bill 49, 1955 Sess., § 55-2(11).
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only be done through administrative supervision, or under a state securi0
ties act 8°--a
fortiori, then, would that be the case in protecting, for instance, against unfair recapitalization plans, unfair provisions of corporate securities, free-loading by promoters, etc.
As against the complexity and difficulty of drafting protective provisions, the drafting of enabling provisions has a beautiful simplicity, with
just enough challenge to bring the "enablingism" home even to a reluctant court. 3 '
(3) Countervailing "Enablingism"
The Model Act solves the problem of evasion through foreign incorporation by going "all out" to make sure that the corporation law of the
state of incorporation, and not local law, governs the "organization" and
the "internal affairs" of a foreign corporation. That will forestall any
local court that might be tempted, especially in the light of the new look
in conflict of laws, to apply some protective features of local law. This
represents, of course, the very opposite of a "protective" concern; here
the concern is that some court may get'some protective ideas with the
resulting uncertainty for management as to which law to plan by. Perhaps the underlying philosophy is that it is better to know that whatever
protectiveness there is in local law can be evaded by outside incorporation than to be in doubt. (But, in any event, there is not really any protective feature in the Model Act that is worth defending against foreign
corporate invaders.) One purpose of "enablingism," then, is to create
certainty, even at the expense of other values.
(4) Controversialness
Almost any protective feature is "controversial"--controversial as to
its need, the extent of the feared abuse, the feasibility of this or that
method of control, the possibility or impossibility of preventing evasion.
The more the drafting committee seeks collaboration with outside specialty experts and representatives of various segments of the interested
community, the more heated the controversy. And there is always a
handy rationale: the proposal is not feasible.
(5) Composition of Drafting Committee
Protective features are mostly aimed at abuse of power. This means
that they would frequently be aimed at management-its power to make
corporate decisions (even self-dealing decisions), its power to swing
30 Lattin & Jennings, Cases on Corporations 167 (3d ed. 1959). The suggestion has a
marked California accent.
31 E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-3.1 (1965) to "enable" a corporation to have less than
three shareholders without running into the trouble which some judges have unreasonably
created for such corporation.
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stockholders' votes through control of the proxy machinery (and in close
corporations the sheer power of majority ownership), its control over
charter and by-law provisions, its "inside" knowledge. But the personnel
of the corporation law drafting committees in most states are usually
identified psychologically with management. The impetus for revising the
existing corporation law usually comes from lawyers with sufficient
knowledge and experience in corporation law to make them realize the
inadequacy of the existing corporation law. The ensuing committee, be it
of the state bar association, or a city or county bar association, or of
"official" origin, is likely to be suggested by and chosen from those best
versed and most interested in corporation law. It is not unnatural for
these corporation lawyers to identify themselves with management and,
in all good faith and professional rectitude, to be not overzealously on the
scent of managerial skullduggery, actual or potential, or to be fired by
a spirit of reform or resentment against the Establishment. You do not
find beatniks on corporation law committees.
(6)

The FederalsMove in-And Current Complacency

The great corporation finance scandals of the first third of the current
century led to a vast takeover by the federal government of areas that
had been left to, and largely neglected by, the states. This takeover was
implemented with an administrative supervision that is constant, alert,
and knowledgeable. The great stock promotion scandals of old have been
rendered if not impossible at least highly improbable under the Securities
Act of 1933, by the basically simple concept of disclosure: when you sell
securities to the public tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, or the SEC (or some aggrieved private party) will get you. The
scandalous stock market manipulations antedating the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 are no more, or so most believe. Nor, with
that act in effect, does a stockholder have to go through years of litigation and frustration, as did Mr. Richard Reid Rogers some thirty-five
years ago, before he could even find out what salaries, bonuses, stock
options, special "credits," etc. management of the corporation in which
he held shares was bestowing upon itself.' Again, that same act throws a
bit of a damper on one of the old abuses: management using its inside
knowledge for playing the market in the corporation's shares 3 Furthermore, under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938, no longer does the
n See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933); Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123
(1933); and those same cases in the lower courts.
33 But see stories currently in the news on the SEC's suit against Texas Gulf Sulphur
management. U.S. News & World Report, May 10, 1965, pp. 96-99. See also leading newspapers of April 20, 1965.
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distress reorganization lend itself to most of the bitter barbs of 1933,14 nor
could a John T. Flynn today, with the Investment Companies Act of
1940 on the books in addition to legislation already mentioned, write a
contemporary diatribe like Investment Trusts Gone Wrong (1931). So
too, comparable dragons in the world of utility holding companies have
been slain by the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
Now, all this federal legislation and administrative implementation
may not have created a perfect world of corporate finance with liberty
and justice for all, but at least many people believe the situation is much,
much better. And whether justice actually be done or not, what is really
important is that people believe that justice is being done. True, an occasional legal scholar does not share the prevailing complacency; for
example, the late Professor Dodd called the pattern of preferred shares
arrearage elimination a "recapitalization racket" and a "reproach" to a
"civilized system" of law. 5 But recapitalization, eliminating preferred
shares' arrearages, is a phenomenon of a period of recovery after a great
economic depression, more a problem of the 1940's than of today. And as
for the dangerous features that state laws permit in securities, concededly
"noncumulative" preferred is a distress-issue security, hardly ever issued
(so far as I have been able to ascertain) except in salvage-operation reorganizations; and these days such reorganization plans are under the
many safeguards of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act with its machinery
for weighing, presumably, any imperfection in securities that are issued
in a reorganization.
In any event, all this federal legislation and activity has gone far to
create the belief that the "bad" parts of the old corporate machinery
have been pretty well replaced, to the further complacency of the draftsmen of state corporation laws, to which complacency is perhaps also added
the uncomfortable suspicion that what they are doing is not so important
anyhow.
(7) The Brooding Omnipresence of Common Law and Equity
In the area of fiduciary duties of corporate officers, directors, and dominant shareholders, the lack of concern in state legislation may be due to
the assumed adequacy, more or less, of the common law and of the ability
of equity to meet new situations. Legislators may feel, for example, that
there is no need for a statutory provision that might put limits to the
limited liability of shareholders who create creditor-proof corporate setS4 See Lowenthal, The Investor Pays (1933), purporting to tell the story of the 1920's
reorganization of the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad.
35 Dodd, "Recapitalization Plans Involving Funding of Accrued Dividends," ABA Proceedings of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Mercantile Law 26, 39 (1945).
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ups and traps for unwary creditors by inadequately capitalized corporations. And, arguably, courts have done a pretty good job of meeting the
problems.
Perhaps it is believed that the common law can be counted upon to
invalidate contracts, by charter and by-law provisions, that purport to
exculpate even for fraud, gross negligence, unintentional wrong-doing,
etc. Courts can be pretty ingenious at this.
So too in that most sensitive area of corporation law, the fiduciary area,
courts have a long tradition of subjecting strategic power-wielders to
trustee-like duties.
(8) Managerial Ethics and Status
Finally, the "public be damned" attitude of big corporate enterprise
of the turn of the century has undergone something of a revolution. In
part as a result of disclosure requirements of the various federal laws
previously mentioned, management in publicly-held corporations virtually lives in a glass house. In consequence it is extremely sensitive not
only of its image with the public but even more of its standing "in the
club." What each corporation does is soon known to management in other
corporations. In such light-of-day even mere overreaching may lead to
loss of status. Students of deterrence may argue whether the raised eyebrow is as effective as the jail sentence, but "acceptance" by the group
is at least one determinant of behavior. This does not mean that shady
dealings are a thing of the past; news in the past few years has told us
of absconders to Brazil with millions of dollars of shareholders' money,
of competition-squelching shenanigans in the electrical industry, and
other doings promoted with high hopes of not getting caught. But in matters of salary, bonuses, stock options, holdings, etc., management in publicly-held corporations has felt new restraints.
Indeed, it is probably in close corporations that the darkest deeds are
being done. Here management's power comes not from being in control
of the proxy machinery but from owning outright the control block of
shares. Here management is supreme, and not subject to publicity requirements. Hence in the close corporation management operates without
fear of shareholders or of public opinion. Curiously enough, in close corporations it has often been the lack of "enablingism" that has led to unfettered majority stock domination. In many states, the small group of
partners in the venture could not get together by contract, either in the
charter or elsewhere, and prescribe what management or majorities could
or could not do; they were henmned in by restrictions in corporation laws
which applied to all corporations but which had actually been drafted for
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the publicly-held corporation. New York at one time was one of the worst
offenders; its new law, following a precedent set by North Carolina,
should clear up many difficulties.1 6 But more than "enablingism" is
needed in the case of the close corporation, with its entrenched power
and secrecy (and consequent lack of extra-legal restraints), to protect
against power-wielders' oppression of minority interests. Very little has
been done in corporation laws in this direction, in part because only recently has the close corporation been recognized as sui generis, with its
37
own problems that call for attention.
SOME CLOSING OBSERVATIONS

Perhaps many of those inclined to seek protection against corporate
abuses are beginning to sense that the great problems of the day with
respect to enterprises (whatever be the corporate or noncorporate form
of the business organization) are not internal corporate affairs but problems of the impact of the enterprise upon the world that it affects economically, politically, and sociologically. Against the really great problems (fairness in employment, for example), internal corporate protective regulation begins to lose significance. To one with the current
spirit of challenge of traditional values and of reform and revolt, there
is no great appeal in, say, a longer and more complicated corporationlaw provision purporting to protect minority shareholders by an appraisal remedy, even if such protective remedies can be shown to be
needed or to work well outside of close corporations.3 One concerned
with protective features inclines to lose zest once he finds himself in that
fantastic statutory pattern which we have come to know as corporation
law, with its over-preoccupation with legal conceptions which grow into
monstrous shapes as they feed upon themselves. (Witness the usual provisions relating to "stated capital," with their ramifications into dividends, distribution, etc.) It is difficult to work up concern for protective
features while tilting at windmills.
36 See, by the scholar in whose honor this issue is published, Stevens, "Close Corporations and the New York Business Corporation Law of 1961," 11 Buffalo L. Rev. 481
(1962).
37 Much of the spadework in this field has been done by my colleague, Professor F.
Hodge O'Neal, in his numerous writings in addition to his treatise, Close Corporations

(1958).

38 Justifiable doubts have been voiced about the need or contribution of appraisal remedies. Manning, "The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker," 72
Yale L.J. 223 (1962).

